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Abstract 
The introduction of performance-related pay with Performance Management in the state school sector 
of England and Wales represents a considerable change in the school management system. After 
2000, all teachers were subject to annual goal setting performance reviews. Experienced teachers were 
offered an extended pay scale based on performance instead of seniority, and to gain access to the 
new upper pay scale, teachers had to go through a ‘threshold assessment’ based on their professional 
skills and performance. This paper reports the results of a panel survey of classroom and head 
teachers which started in 2000 just before implementation of the new system, and then after one and 
after four years of operation. We find that both classroom and head teacher views have changed 
considerably over time, from initial general skepticism and opposition towards a more positive view, 
especially among head teachers by 2004. We argue that the adoption of an integrative bargaining 
approach to performance reviews explains why a growing minority of schools have achieved 
improved goal setting, and improved pupil attainments as they have implemented performance 
management. Pay for performance has been one of the measures of organizational support that head 
teachers could bring to induce changes in teachers’ classroom priorities. We argue that the teachers’ 
case shows that a wider range of performance incentives than previously thought can be offered to 
employees in such occupations, provided that goal setting and performance measurement are 
approached as a form of negotiation instead of top-down. 
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1. Introduction 
In theory, school teachers should be among the least suitable groups for linking pay to performance. 
Nevertheless, despite strong initial opposition among teachers and their unions, and equally strong 
scepticism from academic economists (eg. Richardson, 1999, Dolton et al., 2003), the pay for 
performance system for school teachers in England and Wales, introduced in 2000, appears to be 
gaining acceptance among teachers. In schools where it is practiced systematically, there is 
evidence that it is leading to improved goal setting, and to faster improvements in pupil 
performance than in other schools. This article seeks to explain how this came about. In doing so, it 
argues that we need to broaden current theories linking pay to performance, and consider the way 
performance is defined, through goal-setting and the potential element of individual negotiation in 
this process. 
 
One of the key limitations of existing theory is that it has focused on a narrow range of types of 
output-based pay, such as for semi-skilled workers, sales staff and senior managers, where 
performance is more easily measured. In his Journal of Economic Literature review of current 
research on the subject, Prendergast (1999) urged us to look beyond such groups for a wider 
understanding of pay and incentives for other kinds of employees. In contrast to the former 
occupations, and like many other public service workers, school teachers, of whom there are nearly 
half a million in the UK, have proved a challenge for motivation by conventional forms of pay for 
performance. The nature of their work is ‘imprecise’. It does not comprise a set of well-defined 
techniques that have to be consistently applied, and there is, at best, a loose relationship between 
particular actions and their students’ learning (Murnane and Cohen, 1986). In this respect, their 
work could be said to differ fundamentally from that which has provided the strongest 
demonstrations of how output-based pay can boost performance, such as Lazear’s windshield 
replacers at Safelite (Lazear, 1996). Not only is their work ‘imprecise’, but frequently it involves a 
range of different kinds of activities, some of which are more amenable to measurement than others, 
for example, students’ national test results versus educating future citizens. Their work often 
involves a great degree of interdependency. Even if one can isolate an individual teacher’s 
classroom contribution, which many teachers believe improbable, there remain important areas of 
team-work within schools (Dolton et al, 2003). Moreover, the presence of a ‘collegiate ethos’ 
(Adnett, 2003) diminishes the likelihood that teachers will ‘shirk’ because their effort is hard to 
measure, and so reduces the relevance of one common argument for tying pay to performance. 
 
Thus if we were to stick with the conventional forms of output based pay, which as Prendergast 
notes, have been analysed extensively within Personnel Economics, we should expect to find few 
successful examples of pay for performance in schools. This was indeed the case until fairly 
recently. Despite a proliferation of schemes in the US in the early twentieth century (Murnane and 
Cohen, 1986), and a long-running scheme in England in the latter part of the nineteenth century 
(Dolton et al., 2003), pay for performance virtually disappeared from school teaching in both 
countries for most of the twentieth century. Teaching in schools was barren ground for any kind of 
payment by results, even in private schools (Murnane and Cohen, 1986). Theory and practice 
seemed to agree, and the affair was closed. 
 
Nevertheless, some characteristics of teachers’ work have meant that the issue never quite 
disappeared, and in recent years, it has undergone a revival in the US in a number of school districts 
with performance pay schemes, in Israel (Lavy, 1999) and in Japan1. It has done so most 
dramatically in Britain, where a national scheme, ‘Performance Management’, was introduced in 
2000 in state primary and secondary schools in England and Wales, the subject of this paper. 
                                                 
1 We are indebted to Shushi Okazaki of the Akahata newspaper for information about schools in Japan. 
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The reasons for the sustained interest are easy to understand. It is widely accepted that there are 
considerable variations in teacher effectiveness, a point touched on in the British government’s 
recent teacher recruitment campaign ‘everyone remembers a good teacher’2, and widely 
acknowledged by both classroom and head teachers in the first wave of the survey on which this 
article is based (Marsden, 2000). Governments have also retained an interest for budgetary reasons. 
Faced with a need to raise educational standards, and tight restrictions on public spending increases, 
several national governments have sought to use pay systems more actively as an instrument to 
achieve these ends. Notwithstanding the academic arguments against performance pay, many 
educational practitioners have observed the extent to which existing pay rules were manipulated in 
order to recruit and retain, and the perverse effects of paying teachers for management activities in 
order to enhance their pay. It was widely felt too that the then existing salary system was failing to 
motivate teachers because so many (about 60%) were stuck on the top pay grade, and was 
encouraging them to take on additional non-teaching duties for more pay which diverted them from 
the classroom, and so made raising standards even harder to achieve. There was also a feeling in 
British government circles that even though teachers work very long hours during term time, and 
experience a strong professional ethos, there were few financial inducements to encourage them to 
accept the changes in work priorities sought by the government. 
2. The teachers’ performance pay and performance management system 
The performance management system for state school teachers, introduced by the government in 
2000, sought to address the need to reward teachers better for excellence in the classroom. 
Performance management (PM) sought to combine goal-setting and appraisal with performance 
pay, thus extending the growing practice of other parts of the British public services. It made annual 
salary progression dependent on performance. The new pay scale comprised two parts. For the 
lower part, which was, roughly speaking, the old main pay scale, the annual seniority increments 
were retained, covering roughly the first few years of a teacher’s career. Progression to the new 
‘upper pay scale’ required passing the ‘threshold assessment’, based partly on teachers’ professional 
development, and partly on the progress of their pupils. Progression along the upper scale was 
based entirely on performance. There was also provision for accelerated increments for high 
performers along the lower part of the scale. The associated financial rewards could be 
considerable, potentially taking teachers to earnings to 25% above the top of the lower scale, where 
about 60% of teachers had been clustered in 2000. Unlike some private sector bonus systems, the 
teachers’ performance-related increments are permanent and count for their pensions. In exchange 
for the new structure of rewards, all teachers were required to have an annual performance review 
to set goals and appraise performance, including those on the lower part of the new pay scale. 
 
The most controversial element of the new performance system has been the concept that 
performance should include an element of pupil progress. On the whole, teachers, and their unions, 
have been receptive to rewards for improved inputs, such as for improved skills. However, pupil 
progress relates to their outputs, and this caused widespread opposition, with the largest of the 
teachers’ unions opposing it on the grounds that it amounted to payment-by-results. The other 
unions, which were more supportive of performance review, were also strongly opposed to any 
form of payment-by-results, and were deeply suspicious that in some schools, head teachers would 
implement this part of the new scheme in a mechanistic fashion. Although the Education 
Department provided many ‘good practice’ illustrations of how pupil progress could applied in a 
constructive fashion, there was widespread suspicion among teachers at the outset that the scheme 
was really about using performance pay in order to save money and restrict pay increases to those 
who toed the line. As will be seen, our study shows that this perception declined over time, but has 
nevertheless remained a significant under-current among teachers. 
                                                 
2 The advertising slogan was used by the government’s Teacher Training Agency in the early 2000s. 
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To assist implementation, on its website, the Education Department provided schools with 
numerous examples of good practice concerning how pupil progress could be integrated into 
performance reviews. Many of these illustrate a problem-solving approach to goal-setting and 
appraisal. One example, which is discussed later in this article, shows the objective setting part of 
the review involved a joint analysis of strategies to tackle a student learning problem, how to 
improve attainments of boys in a particular subject, and agreement to implement them during the 
year. The next review in the cycle would then assess how successful implementation had been, and 
the contribution of these strategies to the school’s own goals.  
 
Despite such positive examples, many teachers, and their unions, feared that practice in schools 
would be rather different. It was feared that pressures on head teachers to raise their school’s 
academic performance would lead to payment-by-exam-results. One such pressure, which we 
explored was that of educational ‘league tables’. As a result of changes in funding arrangements and 
the devolution of greater management autonomy, schools now have to compete to attract pupils 
who bring funding. Schools which fail to do so, will experience falling numbers and income, and 
may eventually be closed. A crucial signal to parents in this quasi market is provided by 
comparative tables, league tables, displaying each school’s national exam results. These are 
publicly available on the Education Department’s website, and are frequently published in local 
newspapers so that parents know which schools are getting more pupils through their exams, and 
can benchmark them against local and national standards. 
 
A second aspect of diversity among schools in the implementation of performance management was 
suggested to us in an interview with the former head of Cambridge Educational Associates,3 the 
organisation responsible for monitoring implementation of the threshold. From early on, it seemed 
that some schools had approached performance management as a means of improving how schools 
are run, to achieve better coordination between teachers’ activity in the classroom and the school’s 
wider objectives. In contrast, initially at least, the majority of schools were using the new scheme as 
a means of getting what was felt to be a long overdue pay increase for teachers, and which should 
ease staff retention problems, especially in high living cost areas such as London. Later on, we 
characterise these two strategies as ‘reformer’ and ‘firefighter’. This diversity of strategies will 
make it possible later on to test the effects of the scheme on pupil performance outcomes. 
3. The analytical approach: performance management as ‘integrative’ negotiation 
The examples of good practice performance reviews provided by the Education Department include 
a special feature that is under-developed in the discussions of agency, expectancy, and goal-setting 
theory: namely a view of goal setting as a problem-solving process. That problem is how to align 
individual employees’ work goals with the changing goals of their organisation. In professional 
work, management is dependent on the knowledge and expertise of their staff in order to define 
appropriate performance goals, and especially, to identify the steps necessary for their achievement. 
There needs therefore to be an exchange of information both about objectives, to ensure these are 
realistic, and about the means to reach them. The nature of this asymmetry is illustrated from a 
study by the government’s school inspectorate, which quoted one teacher from a school with a good 
appraisal system which included an element of classroom observation: 
 
‘My classroom observation (by the head) was useless. For one thing he only came once, and 
there was no proper feedback. The head was completely out of touch with recent 
                                                 
3  We are indebted to Mike Chapman, former head of Cambridge Educational Associates, for first drawing our attention 
to the different ways in which schools were approaching the new system.. The CEA was in charge of the system of 
schools’ external advisors for the first wave of threshold assessments. 
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developments in modern language teaching, and so unable to engage in the type of debate I 
hoped for’ (Ofsted, 1996 §15). 
 
The appraiser in this case lacked knowledge of both the subject and its teaching methods, and 
would be hard put to ‘cascade’ objectives top down, and hope that they would be successfully 
implemented. There may also be disagreements about the goals that constitute performance. To 
what extent should the teacher prioritise exam passes versus developing an understanding of, and an 
affection for, the language being taught, and there might need to be compromise from both sides in 
order to sustain commitment to agreed goals. 
 
One framework for thinking about such processes is provided by what Walton and McKersie (1965) 
describe as ‘integrative’ bargaining, or negotiation. However, in this case, it would take place at an 
individual rather than a collective level, between individual teachers and their line managers. 
According to these authors, we should distinguish ‘integrative’ from ‘distributive’ bargaining, the 
latter being about shares of the pie, and the former about problem-solving in order to achieve a 
larger pie. They present four stages or components of integrative bargaining: identifying the 
problem; searching for alternative solutions; selecting the best alternative; and commitment to 
implementation. Whereas the first two may seem relatively technical, the third, selection, involves 
also reference to the preferences of the two parties, or as the two authors stress, to their utility 
functions. The final component brings us back to issues of re-contracting and commitment to 
deliver by both parties. Thus, if performance management is to be seen as involving a significant 
element of integrative bargaining, then one would expect it to show evidence of these components, 
which will be explored in the empirical part of the paper. However, before that, it is helpful to 
compare the integrative bargaining approach with other theoretical approaches to the analysis of 
incentives and performance appraisal. 
 
Several elements of the process of integrative bargaining are recognised individually by the other 
main theories in the area, but they are not treated together. In discussing the optimal design of 
incentives, agency theory deals extensively with issues of monitoring performance, and gaining 
agreement to a mutually satisfactory design of incentives, otherwise the job offer will be rejected. 
Mostly, the emphasis has been on new hires rather than on negotiation with incumbent employees 
(Prendergast 1999, Tzioumis 2005). Agency theory has also looked at issues of renegotiation, 
particularly in relation to pay when firms are faced with changes in market conditions, and it has 
dealt with the problems of ‘hold-ups’ in such relationships, whereby one party threatens to end the 
relationship in order to force the other to make large concessions (Gibbons 1998, Malcomson, 1997, 
Teulings and Hartog, 1998). However, their emphasis has been very much upon distributive rather 
than integrative bargaining, on changing rewards rather than adapting elements of performance. 
 
The psychological theory of goal setting, as recently reviewed by Locke and Latham (2002), has 
recognised that participative goal-setting, with an input from employees, often leads to better 
results, although the emphasis, as Locke and Latham (2002) observe, has been primarily on 
information exchange, and to a lesser extent on goal commitment. Expectancy theory emphasises 
the social exchange between managers and staff, and the need for perceived good faith from 
management in the operation of performance evaluations on which performance pay depends, but 
on the whole, management are left to determine the nature of the nature of performance and its link 
with rewards (Furnham, 1997). A third strand of psychological theories does consider problems of 
contracting and breach of perceived agreement, namely, ‘psychological contract’ theory (Rousseau, 
1995). For sound methodological reasons, Rousseau rejects the idea that organisations can be party 
to psychological contracts: organisations are not psychological entities. 
 
An integrative negotiation approach draws on elements of these theories by offering a stronger 
focus on adapting the content and priorities of work performance to changing needs of the principal, 
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in the light of the expertise and the preferences of the agent, and on the need to advance by mutual 
consent on the basis of give and take by both sides. 
 
The next section of the paper presents the empirical results. The panel results document the change 
from initial hostility to performance management among classroom teachers, and also many head 
teachers, towards declining scepticism about its value among teachers and an increasing belief in its 
usefulness among school heads. It then looks at performance management and head teacher views 
on its contribution towards improved school management, and argues, on the basis of survey 
replies, that it functions in many schools as form of integrative negotiation between school 
management and classroom teachers. The article then seeks to provide rough estimates of the 
proportion of schools in the sample which could be said to practice integrative negotiation 
systematically in performance management, and to show that in these schools, pupil attainments in 
national tests have increased more than in other schools. 
4. Results 
4.1 The nature of the survey 
The primary data source for this study is a panel questionnaire survey of classroom and head 
teachers in the same schools conducted at intervals between 2000 and 2004 by the Centre for 
Economic Performance, and based on a random sample of state schools in England and Wales4. It 
has been carried out in close consultation with the teachers’ unions and professional organisations 
and the Education Department. Nevertheless, it is an independent study. The panel has now 
completed three waves: the first in February-March 2000, before the new scheme was implemented 
(see Marsden, 2000); the second in May-June 2001, after the first round of ‘threshold’ results were 
known; and the third in May-June 2004, after the results of the fourth round of the system, 
including potential progression to point 3 on the new upper pay scale. For classroom teachers, the 
questionnaire probes their attitudes and experiences in relation to performance management, and 
seeks to measure aspects of their work patterns and priorities alongside other variables such as their 
degree of organisational commitment and their assessment of the working atmosphere in their 
schools. A copy of the questionnaire used in the first wave can be found in Marsden (2000). For 
head teachers, it asks also about the operation of performance management in their schools, and 
whether they believe it has assisted them in their management duties. In addition to the ‘before and 
after’ element of the panel, it is possible to link replies from classroom teachers with those of their 
head teachers, and with other information on their schools concerning the impact of performance 
management on work patterns, and some educational outcomes based on Education Department’s 
school performance data. Initially, the panel included replies from about 4,000 teachers and about 
1,000 heads. Accounting for sample attrition, it is possible to link replies from about 1,000 teachers 
and about 300 heads over time through the panel. We conducted a number of checks to see whether 
the panel results reported here differ statistically significantly from the simple cross-section results 
for each wave, and found that on the whole they do not. In combining all these different types of 
information, this study goes much further than previous UK public service studies, such as those 
reviewed in the government’s Makinson Report (2000), by tracking the same individuals over time, 
and by combining multiple points of observation and types of data. These studies, which led 
Makinson to conclude that the schemes practised in the British public services were not working, 
gave no indication as to how employee attitudes changed over time, and lacked independent data on 
performance outcomes, weaknesses the present study has been designed to overcome. 
                                                 
4. Data for schools in Wales were not included in this analysis. 
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4.2 From initial hostility to increasing acceptance of performance management: 2000-2004 
As one would expect from the earlier discussion, at the start, teachers were more sceptical of the 
principle of linking pay to performance and its feasibility in their area of work than other public 
service employees (see Marsden and French 1998). This is reflected in the first wave responses of 
both classroom and head teachers in 2000 (see Table 1 below). Initially only a fifth of classroom 
teachers and a third of heads agreed with the principle of linking teachers’ pay to performance, with 
comparably low percentages of both groups thinking it could lead to a fairer allocation of pay, or 
that it was fair to link pay to pupil progress. Yet, over time, there have been significant increases in 
support for these views, roughly doubling over the duration of the panel. It should be emphasised 
that these are balanced panel results, tracking individuals who replied to all three waves, and so 
represent changes of opinion by individual teachers. By 2004, between half and two-thirds of heads, 
and between one and two fifths of classroom teachers had come to accept these principles. 
 
There have also been equally significant changes in teachers’ beliefs about the appropriateness of 
performance management to teachers’ work. Initially, 90% of classroom and 80% of head teachers 
considered that PM was inappropriate because one could not relate the work done in schools to the 
performance of individual teachers, a point echoed by the economist critics of the scheme (eg 
Richardson, 1999, Dolton et al 2003). By 2004, this had dropped to 75% among classroom teachers, 
and to only 44% among school heads. Likewise, at the outset over a third of heads thought teachers 
had too little autonomy in their jobs to be able to vary their performance, but this had fallen to under 
10% by 2004. Among classroom teachers, fears that managers would use PM to reward their 
favourites, a deep rooted problem in other British public sector performance pay schemes, had 
fallen away from over half in 2000 to less than a fifth by 2004. Thus, even though many teachers 
maintained their opposition to PM, substantial numbers had changed their assessment of it by 2004. 
 
Closely related to these changes in teachers’ attitudes appears to be the growing perception that goal 
setting has been working better than initially expected, as 60% of classroom teachers and 80% of 
heads report that management now sets targets more clearly, and among secondary schools in 
particular, 40% of classroom teachers and 70% of heads say that PM is now used as a means to 
make staff better informed about objectives within the school. By 2004, nearly 40% of teachers 
reported that PM had made them personally more aware of their school’s objectives, the increase 
being particularly strong in secondary schools. Another significant change has been the increased 
perception that PM provides organisational support to teachers, helping to identify their 
professional needs, up from 25% to over 40% between 2001 and 2004 among class teachers, and up 
to over 60% among head teachers by 2004. Among head teachers, there has also been modest 
growth to 45% in 2004 of those who believe that PM has encouraged teachers to focus on pupil 
attainments. 
 
Nevertheless, the salience of pay has remained strong, and it lends some support to the position of 
the largest teachers’ union, the National Union of Teachers, that PM is primarily about paying 
teachers for results, especially in the sense that it represents what its members believe to be the 
underlying reality of the scheme. In the first wave, two thirds of classroom teachers thought the 
scheme was ‘simply a device to avoid giving a pay rise to all teachers’, and even after four years of 
operation, about half of them still believed the scheme was basically about getting more work done. 
Despite the subsequent evidence of high pass rates, a very high percentage of teachers, and a 
substantial number of heads, doubt the government’s commitment to continued funding of 
performance increases, and fear that they will become very selective if constrained by school 
budgets. Initially, and again in 2004, around 80% of classroom teachers believed school budgets 
would impose a quota on performance pay increases, and even after four years of operation, just 
under half of all head teachers believed the same. Thus although the unions have pressed hard to 
ensure that an absolute standard of performance is applied, most teachers believe that budgetary 
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considerations force PM to focus on relative performance, and restrict rewards to the best 
performers. 
 
Apart from who gets incentive pay, there is also the question of how far teachers value the size of 
rewards offered. Although there seems to be a stable group of about one third who believe the new 
salary levels are too small to make them want to work harder, there has been a growing minority 
who disagree, and find the rewards attractive: up from 15% in 2000 to nearly 30% in 2004. Thus 
although other surveys have shown that teachers are not strongly motivated by financial incentives, 
pay being more a source of discontent than of positive motivation (Vaarlem at al 1992), there is 
clearly a group of teachers within the sample who have found the new pay scales attractive. An 
important category among these appears to be new entrant teachers who value the long term 
prospect of earnings on the extended pay scale (Marsden 2000). Finally, a key question for the 
interpretation of PM in schools is how far teachers believe it is operated primarily as a means to 
ensure teachers get their pay increase. This perception was much stronger among classroom than 
among head teachers, with around four fifths of classroom teachers holding this view in 2004, but 
only half of head teachers doing so. This suggests that classroom teachers are keenly aware of the 
link between increased pay and their performance reviews. Although success rates at both the 
Threshold assessment and upper pay scale progression were extremely high between 2000 and 
2004, at over 90%, these were known ex post. Ex ante, the results show both a strong consciousness 
that pay increases require success in the review process, and continuing uncertainty as to whether 
pass rates will, in practice, be determined by absolute criteria, comparable to a ‘driving test’ as one 
teachers’ union official described it, or whether they will be constrained by a quota or budgetary 
restrictions. A good measure of the uncertainty in teachers’ minds about the selective nature of the 
progression linked to performance is shown by their responses between waves to the question about 
whether performance awards are subject to a quota. The second wave took place in spring 2001, just 
after teachers had been informed of the results of the first round of Threshold assessments. There 
was a sharp fall, from over 80% to less than 30%, in the percentage thinking restrictions would be 
applied to the number of successful applications. However, that percentage bounced back to 80% in 
the third wave. The reason for this, suggested to us when presenting preliminary results to the 
teachers’ unions, was that the Education Department had floated proposals shortly before the third 
wave that the money available would be capped so that future increases would be constrained by 
school budgets. On that occasion the proposals were withdrawn, but the continued uncertainty has 
meant that teachers believe the scheme has real teeth. Indeed, there was a long-running tension 
between the government, whose policy is that the scheme should be selective, and the unions, which 
have sought to minimise selectivity.5 
 
The head teacher judgements are noteworthy for the decline in numbers who think of PM primarily 
as a means to get pay increases for their teachers. This was especially true in secondary schools 
which have more developed management systems than primary schools. This would be consistent 
with an increased emphasis on using PM as a means of improving goal setting within schools noted 
earlier on, and is consistent with the point to be developed later on, that the number of schools using 
PM to reform school management has been growing. 
Thus, the first impression from these results is that the predicted failure of performance reviews and 
performance pay in schools has not occurred, and that by 2004, there was every sign that it was 
taking root in schools, providing more motivating rewards for a significant number of teachers. 
Most important, the procedures for defining the kinds of performance that management wanted to 
achieve were proving moderately effective: goal setting was believed to have improved, teachers 
felt management was providing some support to them as a result of PM, and there was an increased 
awareness of the priority to be given to pupil attainments. 
 
                                                 
5. This is described in Marsden and Belfield (2005a). 
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Table 1. Classroom teachers’ judgements of Performance Management: before and after 
implementation (Balanced panel results) 
Abbreviated questions Class  
teachers 
   Head  
teachers 
   
 Wave 1 Wave2 Wave3 Change Wave 1 Wave2 Wave3 Change  
 % agree % agree % agree  % agree % agree % agree  
Acceptance of the basic 
principles of PM 
        
The principle of relating teachers' 
pay to performance is a good one. 
23 29 37 *** 34 37 50 * 
PM will lead to a fairer allocation 
of pay 
6 13 19 *** 28 45 63 + 
Fair to reward for pupil progress  22 22 37 *** 25 45 57 ** 
         
Appropriateness of PM to 
teachers’ work 
        
Hard to relate the work done in 
schools to individual performance 
89 83 75 *** 83 69 44 *** 
Teachers have too little autonomy      36 30 9 *** 
Managers will reward favourites 54 43 19 *** - - -  
PM causes jealousies  88 60 37 *** 81 50 29 *** 
         
Improved goal setting by PM         
Targets set more clearly - 42 60 *** 52 84 82 *** 
Made me more aware of my 
school’s targets 
- 32 37  - - - - 
(Secondary schools only) - 22 35 *** - - - - 
More incentive to focus on pupil 
attainments  
- - - - 40 38 45 Ns 
Used as a means to make staff 
better informed about objectives 
within the school  
- 16 31 *** Na 33 41 Ns 
(Secondary schools only) - 15 37 *** - 44 70 *** 
         
Organisational support through 
PM 
        
Used to help better identify 
teachers’ professional development 
needs. 
- 25 43 *** - 54 63 Ns 
(Secondary schools only) - - -  - 61 74 Ns 
         
Incentives offered by PM         
Salary levels > Threshold are too 
low to make me want to work 
harder   (% agree) 
33 35 33 *** - - - - 
“    “    “     ( % disagree) 15 25 28 *** - - - - 
PM simply a device to get more 
work done 
58 58 49 ** - - -  
(Secondary schools only) 66 65 56 *** - - - - 
There is a budgetary quota on 
Threshold and UPS pay increases 
82 28 79 *** - - -  
PM helped to ensure teachers in 
your school get their pay increase  
- 81 76 Ns - 72 55 ns 
(Secondary schools only) - 79 82 Ns - 64 46 *** 
Change over time significant at: *** <1%; ** <2%; * <5%; + <10%. Ns: not statistically significant 
Number of balanced panel observations: class teachers: c 2300; head teachers: c 100 for most questions. 
Note: Results are based on the balanced panel, that is those replying in each of the three waves. The results of the 
balanced panel mostly differ only slightly from those of the three cross-sections. Scores in the table are weighted by 
sample fractions (smplwt).  
4.3 Performance review in schools as ‘integrative negotiation’ 
Clues as to the reasons for the moderate success of PM by 2004 can be found by looking more 
closely at the process of performance review that lies at the heart of PM. This section explores 
evidence that, in the best cases, performance reviews have functioned as a form of integrative 
  9
negotiation of teachers’ work objectives, and notably in the ‘reformer’ schools. It does so by 
considering in turn each of the four stages of integrative bargaining identified by Walton and 
McKersie. 
a) Identifying the problem 
In the first stage of integrative negotiation, the two parties have to identify the problem which 
brings together the priorities of the organisation and the capacities and orientations of its members. 
In the case of performance review, this means relating the contribution of individual teachers to the 
wider objectives of the school and their adaptation to new circumstances. 
 
From the management side, in recent years, schools have come under a large number of external 
pressures which have made their comparative performance with other schools a key concern. This 
information is easily available to parents of potential pupils, and with the funding changes that 
attach school funding to pupils, schools compete in a ‘quasi market’ (Glennerster, 2002). The 
Education Department also benchmarks school performance, and there is also richer and more 
qualitative information available to all online from government inspectors (Ofsted). Within schools, 
this pressure has become symbolised by the educational league tables of local schools based on 
comparative academic performance at national tests. To capture this element of pressure on head 
teachers, we enquired about the influence of league tables on their schools in the third wave. In that, 
60% of heads reported increased parental pressure as a result of educational league tables. We also 
enquired about the methods used to produce better academic performance in their schools, and 
notably, whether schools sought to learn about educational practices used at comparable schools 
scoring strongly in school league tables. Fifty percent of teachers, and sixty percent of heads, 
replied that their schools did so. Heads were also asked whether they had shifted resources in 
response to league table performance issues: 60% reported greater academic content in courses 
covered by tests; 41% that significant resources were devoted to teaching test skills; and 30% 
reported more resources being provided to test subjects, such as maths, at the expense of other 
subjects. Thus the mixture of benchmarking and quasi market had generated pressure on heads to 
change priorities and shift resources in their schools. Most schools use a range of decision-making 
methods to address such issues, but the performance review has a special place because it provides 
an opportunity for individual-level discussions about individual work objectives and how to relate 
them to school objectives. 
 
The results of our survey indicate that classroom teachers enter this process with different priorities, 
which have also been taken up by their unions. For example, when questioned about the reasons for 
the way they allocated their discretionary working time between different activities, many teachers 
emphasised their desire to give a ‘high quality of education’ as the most important reason, 
particularly for such activities as lesson preparation and feedback. It can also be found in some of 
the written-in comments. As one classroom teacher put it: the new system is based on a ‘narrow 
perception of education as measured by attainment, whereas schools are also about learning to be 
members of a community’6. Indeed, some heads expressed similar views in their own written-in 
comments, but it was their job to make the new system work. Thus performance management can 
be seen as involving a process of problem identification from two sides, which are not necessarily 
in opposition to one another, but they do have distinct points of view which will need to be 
reconciled. 
 
The effectiveness of this process is revealed by the growth in the share of both head teachers and 
team leaders7 who believed that PM had made teachers more aware of school objectives, both 
                                                 
6.  Respondent #622 Classroom teacher-Wave 1. 
 
7 Team leaders are classroom teachers exercising middle management responsibilities. 
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around 60% by wave 3, and had make teachers think more systematically about their work 
priorities, both around 50% by wave 3 (Table 2). Many also thought that it had increased the 
importance of good middle-management in their schools. Given the difficulty for head teachers to 
be acquainted with the detail of their colleagues’ work except in small schools, and their inevitable 
reliance on this intermediate management level, this suggests that in many cases PM has raised 
awareness of the need to strengthen the linkage between different levels of management within 
schools. 
 
 
Table 2. Contribution of performance management to improved goal setting in schools: Head 
teachers’ and team-leaders’ views (balanced panel) 
Performance management has: Wave Head Teachers 
Agree % 
 
Team leaders 
Agree % 
made more teachers aware of the school’s 
objectives in the School Improvement Plan  2 41 
 
47 
 3 57** 65* 
    
made teachers think more systematically about their 
work priorities  2 39 
 
37 
 3 54* 50* 
    
increased the importance of good middle  
management.  2 55 
 
45 
 3 60 42 
Note: sample numbers in the balanced panel are 104, and in the cross section about 420 and 290 respectively in waves 2 
and 3. Changes between waves are statistically significant (Chi2 prob <=1%) for  questions 1 and 4, significant at the 
5% level for priorities, and not significant for middle management. Similar differences between the waves are shown in 
the comparison of cross-section data, but significance levels are higher, except for middle management owing to the 
larger number of observations. 
Statistical significance of change between Waves 2 and 3: ** 1%; * 5%.  Results weighted by sample fractions. 
b) Searching for alternative solutions 
The second stage of integrative negotiation involves identifying strategies for solution, and how to 
implement them, including support given to teachers by their schools. The survey did not probe 
directly the search for alternative solutions, but when considered with other sources, there is indirect 
evidence that this occurs in the best cases. A first source is the good practice case study material 
provided by the Education Department at the outset, which drew on existing practice in some 
schools, and sought to show others how PM could be used (see Box 1 below). The spirit of these is 
to suggest open enquiry in the search for solutions rather than a strict top-down approach. The 
Education Department’s guidance stated:  
 
‘Objectives would typically emerge from a discussion between team leaders and individual 
teachers about the priorities for the coming year and the particular ways in which the teacher 
can help the pupils he or she teaches. This might involve targeting the progress of a group of 
pupils which is not meeting expectations or a small number of named pupils. Or it might be 
a priority to implement new policies or develop approaches or techniques which will help 
pupils to progress e.g. better classroom management skills.’ DfEE (1999, p.10) 
 
Thus, having identified a problem, the two parties work together to devise a strategy to tackle it. 
The same spirit was illustrated in a number of case studies included in the same document, and 
which fleshed out these general principles. 
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Box 1: Objective Relating to Pupil Performance: Class Teacher (Year 5) 
 
Background: Evaluation of optional Year 4 test data and the Year 4 teacher’s own assessments 
shows a clear gender gap in attainment in English and a weakness across the class in writing. In the 
judgement of the Year 4 teacher, by the end of the year about 60% of children in the class were not 
able to do all that the Literacy Framework expects. In his view about 70% of boys fell into this 
category as opposed to 50% of girls. 
The objective: by the end of Year 5, to increase substantially the percentage of the class as a whole 
that will be able to do almost all of what the Literacy Framework states that they should be taught 
over the year, in writing as well as reading, and to reduce the gender gap from the present 20%. 
In discussion: the teacher and team leader might discuss the importance of remedying identified 
weaknesses in children’s knowledge of spelling conventions, sentence construction and 
punctuation, and teaching strategies known to be helpful for boys such as clear short term targets or 
use of non-fiction writing exercises. The review meeting would discuss the outcomes achieved by 
the children and review comparative achievement by boys and girls. 
 
Source: DfEE (1999). 
 
Other examples provided by the Education Department include the provision of support to teachers 
to enable the objectives to be achieved, most notably, further professional development to provide 
additional skills where needed, but they also included other types of support, as identified in the 
objective setting process. 
 
An important part of the search for alternative solutions involves consideration of the means 
required for their implementation. Management controls many of these resources, so it is to the 
head teachers’ replies that one has to turn for evidence of this (Table 3). The questions that 
comprise the table reflect the factors identified by heads in the first wave as potential causes of 
variations in the effectiveness of experienced teachers in their schools, and therefore which are 
likely to be addressed in the development of new strategies for the school. Thus, we asked heads 
whether PM had enabled them to address some of these problem factors. By wave 3, benefits were 
identified in a substantial minority of cases, between 20 and 35%, the most important being 
assistance in identifying teachers’ professional development needs, and workload problems. There 
was a notable increase between the second and third waves for some issues. By 2004, 35% of heads 
in the balanced panel reported that PM had helped them identify and assist teachers whose 
workload problems might inhibit their performance. 
 
Table 3. Performance management as a means of supporting teachers:  
Head teacher views, balanced panel. 
PM has helped the school assist those teachers: Wave 2 Wave 3 
 % agree  % agree  
- with difficult or inappropriate workloads.  11 35** 
- whose professional development needs  
are greatest  37 
 
36 
- whose morale was low  18 23 
- who had difficulty motivating their pupils.  12 21* 
Change between Wave 2 and Wave 3: statistical significance: ** 1%; * 10% level 
Weighted by sample fractions. Number of observations: balanced panel 103, and in the cross section, wave 2 
c. 415, and wave 3, c. 290. 
c) Selecting the best alternative:  
An important part of integrative negotiation lies in involvement of both parties in selecting the best 
alternative: otherwise it is hardly a negotiation. Teachers were asked about the conduct of their own 
performance reviews. A first test is whether teachers themselves thought the agreed priorities 
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reflected the wider objectives of their schools, as in certain key management documents, such as the 
School Development Plan (SDP) (Table 4). They might for example have disagreed with the 
question because they thought the head had imposed some personal objectives unrelated to those of 
the school, or because the teachers were ignorant of the school’s objectives. In either case, one 
would conclude that that the resulting solution was not seen by both parties as the ‘best alternative’. 
Although some of the written-in comments by teachers mentioned objectives being imposed on 
them in their performance reviews, the answers to other questions in Table 4 also confirm that 
around 90% of teachers felt fully involved in the process: they had the opportunity to discuss 
objectives, to influence those chosen, and account was taken of their professional needs. 
Confirming the ‘golden thread’ that the government established in the scheme, in the great majority 
of cases, the performance reviews included indicators of pupil progress. On this evidence at least, it 
would seem that teachers were involved in the selection of the best alternative strategies to achieve 
their objectives, and thus participated in the third stage of integrative negotiation.  
 
 
Table 4. Teachers’ reports on the nature of their most recent performance review. 
(balanced panel)  
 Wave 2 Wave 3 
 
Reference of individual goals to school goals 
% agree % agree
Did they relate to the wider objectives of the school (as in SDP or team plans)? 91 89 
Did they include indicators of pupil progress? Na 81 
Teacher influence on goal setting   
Did you have the opportunity to discuss them with your team leader?  96 91+ 
Could you influence the objectives chosen? 92 89 
Did they take account of your professional needs? 79 78 
Evidence of commitment to agreed goals   
Were your objectives clear and measurable? 94 88+ 
Do you understand how they will be monitored and reviewed? 81 87 
Are you in a position to achieve your objectives? 93 87* 
Did you agree your objectives with your team leader? 97 Na 
Significance of change wave 2 to wave 3: * 5%; + 10%. Not every question was asked in both 
waves to minimise the demands placed on respondents. 
d) Commitment to implementation: 
The final stage of any integrative negotiation concerns commitment to implementation. A necessary 
part of this is that objectives should be clear and measurable, that there should be verifiable criteria 
of fulfilment, and an understanding of the monitoring procedures. Without these, the process could 
easily become an empty exercise. The overwhelming majority of teachers (c. 90%) reported that 
they had clear and measurable objectives, and a slightly smaller percentage said that they 
understood how progress would be monitored and reviewed, and that they were in a position to 
achieve their objectives (Table 4). They also considered their objectives were realistic, and nearly 
all said they had agreed them. As with choosing objectives, so with monitoring, the Education 
Department gave considerable guidance as to how statistical and other evidence could be used to 
help define and monitor achievement of objectives. 
 
Considering these replies at face value, there is a strong case for concluding that integrative 
negotiation is an important component of performance management as it is practiced in many 
schools. Inspection of the written-in comments underlines this, but it also raises some questions 
about the significance of the very high level of positive reports. On the positive side, one head 
teacher wrote: ‘It has helped in the move towards being a self evaluating school and to establish the 
need for more challenging objectives for staff. The previous system was “cosy”’, (#30033). In 
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similar vein, another head said: ‘[PM] has made them more aware of the need for objective 
evidence to prove pupil progress’ (#30113). On the negative side, some classroom teachers 
expressed adverse comments, of which one wrote: ‘PM has resulted in teachers doing more admin, 
tasks analysis, statistical work and less time given to creating interesting vibrant lessons’, (#20888). 
 
One explanation of such divergent written-in views, apart from their relatively small number 
compared with the main replies, is that head teachers had a somewhat different perception of 
performance management than their classroom teachers. For the former, PM involved use of data 
and other materials to diagnose problems faced by their schools. For the latter, in schools where the 
message had not been well communicated, statistical data were irrelevant to the task of ‘creating 
interesting vibrant lessons’. One measure of whether PM was mere form-filling and agreeing a 
paper exercise lies in the extent to which both head and classroom teachers share the view that PM 
has led to improved goal setting in their schools. Where classroom teachers experience PM as a lot 
of meaningless statistics they are unlikely to have been involved in the problem-solving dimension 
of goal-setting. To this we now turn. 
5. Instrumentality of PM in linking classroom teacher and school-wide objectives  
Integrative negotiation requires two parties, and so it is important to demonstrate that the schools in 
which this was best developed were also those in which teachers had greater awareness of school 
objectives. This requires a linking of replies from classroom and head teacher. Ideally, we should 
compute average scores for teacher awareness of objectives in a particular school, and then compare 
these with the judgements of the head teacher on the quality of the different stages of integrative 
negotiation within the performance review process. Unfortunately, the response rate across schools 
was too variable, and so we tackle the question the other way round: whether the teachers who said 
PM had made them personally more aware of their school’s objectives were working in schools in 
which the heads reported that PM was effective? Although there appears to have been a 
considerable improvement in the operation of PM between waves 2 and 3, we limit this analysis to 
wave 2 because it contained a wider range of descriptive questions to head teachers about the 
conduct of performance reviews. 
 
To gauge the quality of performance reviews as judged by the head teachers, we conducted a factor 
analysis which boiled eighteen questions down to three dimensions: whether PM had led to clearer 
goals being set; whether objectives were agreed to by teachers in their schools; and whether the 
school provided support, such as for professional development. These three indexes were then 
included in an ordered probit regression on classroom teacher replies as to whether their 
performance review had raised their awareness of school objectives. The latter variable included a 
five point scale from disagree strongly to agree strongly. We also included some descriptive 
questions from the teacher questionnaire relating to aspects of their performance reviews, plus a set 
of control variables. The results are shown in Table 5. Although the pseudo r-squared is low, it is 
statistically significant at the 0.1% level. The important conclusion from the table is that when head 
teachers judge performance management to provide clearer goals and, that those goals are agreed, 
classroom teachers are more likely to report that it has increased their awareness of their school’s 
objectives. Likewise, classroom teachers are more likely to find PM increases their goal awareness 
when the performance review is carried out systematically, when there are specific and clear goals, 
their own needs are taken into consideration, and when they see their school using PM to inform 
and to support its teachers. 
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Table 5. Factors raising the awareness of class teachers of their school’s objectives 
Dependent variable: ‘PM has made me more aware of the targets set in the school development plan.’  
(Ordered probit, values from 1, disagree strongly to 5, agree strongly.) 
 Coef. Sign-
ific-
ance 
Std. Err. Variable 
type 
Head teacher policies on PM in their school     
Clearer goals .1346927 ** .0547 Factor score 
Objectives agreed .1482757 *** .0388 Factor score 
Provision of support .0278599  .0489 Factor score 
Teacher views of their latest Performance Review     
Specific objectives set in PR -.3596218 *** .1379 Dummy 
Clear objectives set in PR .1137584  .1214 Dummy 
Objectives related to SDP .3119143 *** .0941 Dummy 
Objectives take account of professional needs .1723101 * .0829 Dummy 
School provides a mentor for applications .1068846  .0764 Dummy 
Teacher eligible for Threshold -.2677386 ** .1178 Dummy 
School uses PM to inform about objectives .4737709 *** .1286 Dummy 
School used PM to assist profession dev .3853758 *** .0998 Dummy 
Significance: *** <1%, ** 2%, * 5%. Robust standard errors used. 
Control variables on teacher and school characteristics included dummies if female, aged over 30, part-time, had a 
degee, union member, secondary school, and number of school pupils. Of these, only ‘secondary school’ was 
significant, at 0.1%, with a coefficient of -0.3. 
Pseudo R2=0.045, prob = 0.000 Wald chi2=158.7, n=1699. Data analysed using STATA 9. Factor analysis of head 
teacher views was based on an analysis of 18 variables on different aspects of PM in their schools. These scores have a 
mean of zero and a standard deviation of unity. The variables were adjusted by setting missing values to neutral values 
to ensure the regression was based on full coverage of the response for wave 2. Total teacher response in wave 2: 1792, 
used replies in regression: 1699. 
 
A slightly different angle on the same question is provided by examining the degree to which head 
teachers, the school leadership group and classroom teachers all share the view that PM has caused 
goal setting to become clearer and more effective in their schools. Again the motivation for this 
analysis is that a consistent set of views is much more likely if goal setting is being run 
systematically in a school, and in a spirit of integrative negotiation. If the spirit is all ‘take’, or that 
goals are imposed on teachers, or just that heads have unrealistic views about how the process is 
running in practice in their schools, then one would expect no relationship between head, leadership 
group and classroom teacher views. In the absence of a coordinated approach, individual teachers 
may have good or bad experiences with their individual department heads, but these would not be 
consistent within the same school. On the other hand, if there is coordination, one would expect the 
views of these three groups to converge. 
 
We approach this issue by combining a number of questions to head teachers on the contribution of 
PM in their schools to more effective goal setting, and computing an index based on a factor 
analysis, and then tabulating these against classroom teacher judgements about goal setting. This 
provides an indication of the degree to which the two sets of judgements coincide (Table 6, Panel 
A). Being a factor score, the mean is zero and the standard deviation is unity, so that roughly two 
thirds of cases should lie in the range between plus and minus one. Thus, a positive score for school 
‘x’ indicates that the strength of the head’s assessment of goal setting is above the average for 
schools in the sample. Thus in Panel A, we observe that in schools where classroom teachers agree 
strongly that PM has improved goal setting, the heads’ scores are also above average and in the 
positive direction (at 0.439), indicating a convergence of their views. Conversely, in the schools 
where the teachers judge PM has not improved their awareness of school goals, we observe lower 
scores for the head teacher assessments. Thus, as with the ordered probit analysis, we find evidence 
that, where heads report PM as working effectively, so too do classroom teachers. 
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Table 6. Comparing the effectiveness of PM as seen by head teachers and classroom teachers 
in the same school. 
 
Index of effective goal setting as judged by head teachers. 
 
Panel A: Index related to class teacher views of effects of PM (all classroom teachers including 
those in the leadership group): 
 PM has made me 
more aware of 
school targets 
 
PM has given me 
incentive to work 
beyond job 
requirements 
PM means good 
work now rewarded 
PM makes managers 
set clearer targets 
Agree strongly .439 .268 .202 .194 
Agree .100 .160 .133 .108 
Disagree .046 .101 .107 .040 
Disagree strongly -.075 .104 .057 -.001 
     
Neutral/no view .214 .118 .088 .143 
 
Panel B: Index related to the leadership group views on the effects of PM on classroom teacher 
performance. 
 
Leadership group 
response (excl head): 
PM makes class teachers 
more aware of school 
targets 
PM promotes better work 
priorities among class 
teachers 
PM increases 
importance of good 
middle-mgt in the 
school 
Agree strongly .402 .300 .181 
Agree .111 .202 .188 
Disagree .105 .127 .095 
Disagree strongly -.359 -.302 -.217 
    
Neutral/no view .210 .054 .131 
Factor scores for better goal setting as judged by head teachers. Cells show factor scores for head teacher replies in 
these schools, waves 2 and 3 combined. Mean zero, standard deviation of unity. 
 
We are able to take this a step further by examining how far both head teachers and the leadership 
group (departmental heads and team leaders) coincide in their assessments of the effect of PM on 
goal setting for classroom teachers (Table 6, Panel B). This is more a measure of consistency of 
view within the managerial hierarchy in schools. One would expect to find such consistency in 
schools in which integrative negotiation is a part of PM, which is shown by the rising value of the 
head teachers’ index as we move towards schools where the leadership group has a positive 
assessment of PM. 
 
Finally, we turn to the relationship between heads’ judgements of the effectiveness of goal setting 
and class teachers’ reports concerning the content and conduct of PM in the same schools. As 
already mentioned, pupil progress has been the litmus test for the government as to whether or not 
‘performance’ is real. As can be seen in Table 7, in schools where head teachers judge PM to be 
effective, classroom teachers are more likely to report a continued emphasis on pupil progress 
within PM. Secondly, echoing the element of organisational support to teachers where PM has been 
well-implemented, teachers are more likely to be confident that merit will be rewarded – ‘all good 
teachers’ can expect to progress on the upper pay scale. Finally, reflecting the external pressures on 
school management, it is notable that where head teachers report effective goal setting, class 
teachers report that their school actively benchmarks its educational practices on other good-
performing schools. 
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Table 7. Class teacher views of changes to PM 
Class teacher responses  (all classroom teachers) Yes No Neutral 
/no view 
Now less focus on pupil progress in PM .0484 .1819 .0623 
All good teachers can now reach point 3 on UPS .1205 .089 .095 
School looks to education practices of schools higher up league 
tables .1259 .0360 .1505 
Cells: head teacher scores of whether PM aids goal setting in their school. All class teachers combined. 
6. How many schools have adopted the ‘reformer’ strategy? 
By now it is clear that behind the general picture of growing acceptance and increasing positive 
assessment of PM shown in Table 1, there is considerable diversity in the way in which the national 
scheme has been implemented in individual schools. Thus there would seem to be schools where it 
is quite reasonable to accept the PM has functioned like a process of integrative individual-level 
negotiation, whereas in others, this seems to be far from the case. This diversity was reflected in 
some of the written-in comments. One teacher wrote: ‘Teachers feel obliged and pressurised into 
making unrealistic targets at the beginning of the year which they then cannot fulfil during the year’ 
(‘#833 T-W2). On the other hand, one head wrote in: ‘PM has improved the positive attitude to 
professional development and self-improvement within the overall picture of school improvement’ 
(#60162 H-W2). 
 
There will clearly be a large grey area of PM practice in between the cases of imposed goals and 
those where there is a real spirit of negotiation. Therefore, a precise allocation of schools into one or 
other category is impossible and any measure has to be taken with a grain of salt. As schools change 
over time, so the manner in which they apply PM may also evolve. Therefore it is better to talk of 
strategies adopted by schools, and which may change, rather than to seek to characterise individual 
schools. Thus, a first strategy, hinted at earlier on is the ‘reformer’ strategy, where the school seeks 
to use PM as an opportunity to improve management and to use goal setting to improve 
coordination within the school. On the other hand, the ‘fire-fighter’ strategy groups two broad 
approaches: to use PM to get teachers their pay rise, and so reduce staff recruitment and retention 
problems; and to use PM to impose targets on teachers in an attempt to raise performance. Both of 
these are likely to be driven by crises. A school may well switch strategies, from being a ‘fire-
fighter’ to being a reformer, for example, once retention problems have been resolved, and there is 
time to move on to other issues. 
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Table 8. Percentage of schools with ‘joined-up’ goal setting:  
Schools  in which class teachers respond ‘agree’ given that both head teachers and the leadership 
group agree that PM has improved goal setting in their schools 
 
 PM has led to improved goal setting in my school 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) 
 % agree % agree % agree % agree 
 Cross section analysis pooled across waves 
Waves 2 & 3 
using pooled 
responses 
28.7 26.5 26.0 15.6 
Schools with a 
complete  set of 
observations 
397 219 273 224 
 Panel analysis using wave-specific responses 
Wave 2 20.4% 27.2 14.3 8.2 
Wave 3 35.8% 38.5 26.8 20.3 
No complete  obs.  
wave 2 
206 81 70 85 
No complete sets 
of obs  wave 3 
137 65 82 74 
Notes: column headings: 
(a) heads and all classroom teachers 
(b) heads and leadership group 
(c) leadership group and non-leader class teachers 
(d) heads, leaders and non-leader class teachers 
The heads’ judgements on goal setting were based on the same index as that used in Tables 5 and 6, but 
taking the median value as dividing positive from negative judgements as to whether PM had improved goal 
setting. The leadership group values relate to those who agreed that PM had improved goal setting in their 
schools, as did the class teacher question. Members of the leadership group were identified from the 
biographical data obtained in the first wave. The number of observations in the panel was reduced by the 
need to have responses from both heads and the relevant group of classroom teachers for each school.8  
 
One way to identify the ‘reformer’ strategy might be to enquire whether goal setting is integrated 
within a school, and in the spirit of the previous discussion, to explore whether both classroom and 
head teachers’ agree PM has improved goal setting in their schools. We characterise schools with 
the ‘reformer’ strategy as those in which head teachers give above average scores using the index of 
goal setting quality in Tables 5 and 6, and where the classroom teachers agree it has improved goal 
setting. On these rough and ready estimates, we may characterise between 15% and 25% of schools 
in the sample as pursuing the ‘reformer’ strategy (Table 8). This can be seen in the top row, which 
uses the largest number of observations available by pooling responses for 2001 and 2004. A 
similar analysis was carried out for the other indicator used in the earlier tables, namely, whether 
PM had increased one’s personal awareness of school targets. The effects were somewhat smaller, 
but so too was the number of positive replies to that question. These estimates are consistent with 
those of early case studies by Wragg et al (2001), and by Mahoney et al. (2003), who found modest 
effects of the new system in changing how teachers perform. However, what these early studies 
could not capture is the growth in the number of schools adopting the ‘reformer’ strategy. Even 
though the small numbers of effective observations beckons caution, whichever measure is used, 
                                                 
8. Although we had information from 424 schools for the balanced panel analysis, this yielded only 214 in wave 2 and 
139 in wave 3 with information on the head’s assessment of improved goal setting. The numbers of schools with a 
complete set of observations dropped further when tabulating these replies against those of classroom and leadership 
group teacher. This will tend to eliminate smaller schools disproportionately. Results are unweighted and do not correct 
for over-sampling of secondary schools. 
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there has been an increase of about ten percentage points in such schools: from 10-20% in 2001 to 
20-30% in 2004. The growth in the numbers of ‘reformer’ schools was confirmed by computing a 
transition matrix between such schools in 2001 and 2004, which showed strong movement from 
‘fire-fighter’ schools in 2001 into the ‘reformer’ category in 2004, with only small number of 
moves in the opposite direction. Thus, one can say that the number of schools adopting the 
‘reformer’ strategy has increased quite strongly since the inception of the new system. 
7. School performance 
Finally, we turn to effects of PM on school performance as reflected in the government’s league 
table performance indicators. It is impossible to test whether the new system has led to improved 
pupil results for the whole country because there are too many other factors at work. However, it is 
possible to examine whether the schools which implemented performance management most 
thoroughly achieved greater improvements in their results than those which did not. Comparing 
improvements in goal setting with improvements in academic performance over time across schools 
enables us to factor out many of the possible competing variables. It should be added that national 
tests are externally assessed so that although there has been debate about grade inflation across the 
system as a whole, the scope for any individual schools to inflate their grades is small. It is quite 
likely that using a relative measure understates the possible full effect of PM on school 
performance, but we have no simple way of adjusting for the unknown amount of general grade 
inflation. 
 
To gauge these we take changes in the academic results of schools at Key Stage 2 (age 10) for 
primary schools, and for GCSE9 (age 15) for secondary schools (Table 9). We identify those 
schools which improved their relative academic performance as reflected in the results for school 
years ending 1999-2000 and 2002-2003, and compare this group with those reporting an 
improvement in goal setting between waves 2 and 3. The sample numbers of those changing 
between waves 2 and 3 are quite small, so the results can be only tentative, but we found a positive 
and statistically significant relationship: schools whose heads report improvements in goal setting 
were more likely also to have improved their academic results. 
 
 
Table 9. Goal setting and school performance 
(Column %) Improved relative academic performance at school 
Improved use of goal setting in school No Yes 
No 53 40 
Yes 47 60 
   
 Chi^2 3.1 
 P 0.079 
Note:  table shows changes between waves 2 & 3. 
Note:  goal-setting factor score as in Tables 5 and 6. Based on the 169 observations for schools that could be matched. 
 
Confidence in these results is boosted by similar findings by researchers at the CMPO, Bristol 
University, using a completely different methodology, which show a positive effect of threshold 
assessment on the academic performance of pupils in classes taught by eligible teachers (Atkinson 
et al. 2004). The CMPO study examines the change in academic achievements of pupils in classes 
taught by teachers who were, or were not, eligible to pass the Threshold. They found that pupils 
with teachers eligible to pass the Threshold were more likely to improve their performance. 
Although the CMPO study emphasises the financial incentive of passing the threshold, their 
evidence is consistent with this paper. Their statistical results could equally well derive from 
                                                 
9 General Certificate of Secondary Education. 
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improved goal-setting as opposed to simple financial incentive. Although the findings of our own 
study suggest that most teachers are not strongly motivated by the extra financial rewards offered, it 
is clear that going through the threshold application procedures would make them more amenable to 
focusing on the goals agreed with their head teachers. 
8. Conclusions  
This paper has shown that despite initial academic scepticism and the hostility of many teachers and 
their unions, performance management had, by 2004, taken root in many state schools in England, 
and was contributing to improved goal setting. Although such schools were still in the minority by 
2004, in those where PM had become well established, it had also contributed to improved pupil 
performance. The reason the initial academic scepticism was misplaced was that insufficient 
account was taken of how the problems of performance definition and monitoring could be resolved 
by appropriate goal-setting measures. This suggests that if we are take up Prendergast’s challenge to 
look at performance incentives across a wider range of occupations, we need to give more 
consideration to mechanisms for defining and agreeing performance goals. 
 
Although some of the leading exponents of goal setting theory have systematically downplayed the 
importance of financial incentives (e.g. Locke and Latham, 1990), they have assumed a key 
supporting role in the teachers’ case. For teachers, the link with pay has been of central importance. 
At one level, it was the ‘bribe’ to gain acceptance for the new system: no performance management, 
no large pay increase. But there is also a sense in which it has functioned as performance related 
pay, and so contributed to the negotiation between school management and classroom teachers. 
Heads can decide who to put forward for the Threshold assessment, and they can choose when to 
propose their colleagues for movement along the upper pay scale. The evidence from a teacher’s 
performance review is one of the key items in the submissions for pay progression. Up until the 
time of the latest wave, in practice, and ex post, success rates at the Threshold and for upper pay 
scale progression have been very high, and some have argued it is virtually automatic. However, 
this is to miss the power heads have to advance or postpone proposals for upper pay scale 
advancement, and the impact of the long-running uncertainty over central government funding for 
performance increases. Ex post the pass rates may be high, but ex ante, in the eyes of most teachers 
and their heads, according to the evidence of the CEP surveys, the outcome is uncertain. It is surely 
the ex ante prospect that drives behaviour rather than the ex post knowledge. 
 
The link with pay introduces another element, namely that of negotiation. It has been argued in this 
paper that an appropriate framework for considering the effective cases of goal setting within PM is 
that of integrative negotiation. The rates of pay are fixed by national pay scales, and schools are 
constrained by Education Department rules as to how they allocate their budgets. Nevertheless, 
putting a teacher forward for the Threshold or for upper pay scale progression earlier rather than 
later is one of the measures of organisational support available to head teachers when trying to work 
out solutions to the kind of problems that are the focus of PM: alignment of individual and 
collective goals, and renegotiating work priorities. Walton and McKersie were careful to retain a 
reference to the parties’ utility functions within their analysis of integrative bargaining. Problem-
solving has perhaps always a technical component, but the chosen solution nearly always also 
affects the welfare of both parties. Putting a teacher forward for progression is one of the elements 
of support alongside professional development, and adjustment of inappropriate workloads that can 
be used to help persuade individual teachers to adjust their work priorities to those needed by their 
schools. 
 
Could this be achieved without the link with pay? A previous Conservative government introduced 
a national teacher appraisal scheme in 1991, yet it was not widely implemented in practice (Ofsted, 
1996), and what was left of it was replaced in 2000. In contrast, PM has been almost universally 
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implemented, and as shown in the CEP surveys, its design in most schools, as concerns written 
objectives and so on, follows the key Education Department’s guidelines. Although it is difficult to 
probe in this survey, there are signs of important differences between the ‘fire-fighter’ schools 
which have just used PM as a form-filling exercise to get teachers their pay increase, and the 
‘reformer’ schools. The former dissociated the two processes, and have paid the price as PM 
appears to have been less effective than in the ‘reformer’ schools, and arguably less beneficial in 
terms of pupil attainments. 
 
One piece of evidence that would have helped to clinch the argument about changing priorities and 
practices by classroom teachers as a result of PM was lost in the course of the survey. It had been 
hoped to track how teachers allocated their discretionary time, this being considered a better 
measure than questions about changes of priorities and practices. Unfortunately for the study, 
measurement of this variable was disturbed by conflicts over teachers’ working hours, and 
government action to ‘remodel’ teachers’ working time. It also proved impossible to capture 
teachers’ working time use at the same point in the school year while at the same time surveying 
attitudes at the same point in the performance management cycle. As a result, there proved to be too 
much ‘noise’ in this key variable. Nevertheless, we know from the replies of head teachers that 
many of them have shifted resources and teaching priorities towards more academic and test 
subjects in response to league table pressures, and these are more likely to include ‘reformer’ 
schools. With this, the good practice examples of performance reviews, and the evidence of 
improved pupil attainments in ‘reformer’ schools, we can infer that many teachers have adjusted 
their work priorities as a result of performance management where it has been well run. 
 
By the time of the last wave in 2004, it was clear that effective performance management was 
spreading as a result of more schools adopting a systematic approach rather than diffusing evenly 
by the same amount across all schools. Hence the interest in identifying those with the ‘fire-fighter’ 
and ‘reformer’ strategies, and tracking those that switch. Adopting the ‘reformer’ strategy opens up 
not just a one-off change in performance for the school, but rather provides it with the means of 
addressing continuously changing priorities. Professional groups may bring a high degree of 
motivation by virtue of their professional ethos, but that can also prove conservative in the face of 
such changes. The cases of systematic performance management suggest that by approaching goal 
setting as a form of integrative negotiation, a way is opened to addressing changing school priorities 
on a long-term basis. Recognising this is important, because professional groups, such as teachers, 
bring expert knowledge to their work that is not always accessible to management. Even when the 
manager is another teacher, there may be differences in subject knowledge and teaching methods, 
so that it is hard to identify and impose top down new objectives and the strategies to achieve them. 
Approaching the process as one of integrative negotiation enables both parties to engage in a 
dialogue on their respective objectives, the means to achieve them, and the measures of 
organisational support needed. In such cases, agreement to goals is arguably the more appropriate 
means of gaining commitment to fulfil them. 
 
  21
9. References 
Adnett, N. (2003) ‘Reforming Teachers' Pay: Incentive Payments, Collegiate Ethos and UK Policy’, 
Cambridge Journal of Economics, 27: 1, Jan., pp.145-157. 
Atkinson, A., Burgess, S., Croxson, B., Gregg, P., Propper, C., Slater, H. and Wilson, D. (2004) 
‘Evaluating the Impact of Performance-related Pay for Teachers in England’, Working 
Paper 04/113, Centre for Market and Public Organisation, University of Bristol, 61 pages. 
DfEE (1999) Performance Management Framework for Teachers: Consultation Document, 
Department for Education and Employment, London, September 1999 
Dolton, P., McIntosh, S. and Chevalier, A. (2003) ‘Teacher Pay and Performance’, Bedford Way 
Papers, Institute of Education, London. 
Furnham, A. (1997) The Psychology of Behaviour at Work: The Individual in the Organization, 
Psychology Press, Hove and New York. 
Gibbons, R. (1998) ‘Incentives in |Organizations’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 12: 4, Fall, 
pp. 115-132. 
Glennerster, H. (2002) ‘United Kingdom Education 1997-2001’, Oxford Review of Economic 
Policy, 18: 2, pp. 120-136. 
Lavy, V. (1999) ‘Evaluating the Effect of Teachers’ Performance Incentives on Pupils’ 
Achievements’, Working Paper, Hebrew University of Jerusalem. 
Lazear, E. (1996) ‘Performance Pay and Productivity’, NBER Working Paper #5672, August. 
Locke, E. A, and Latham, G. P. (1990) A Theory of Goal Setting and Task Performance, Prentice- 
Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ. 
Locke, E. A. and Latham, G. P. (2002) ‘Building a Practically Useful Theory of Goal Setting and 
Task Motivation: A 35-Year Odyssey’, American Psychologist, 57: 9, Sept., pp.705-717. 
Mahony, P., Menter, I. and Hextall, I. (2003) The Impact of Performance Threshold Assessment on 
Teachers’ Work: Summary Report, Roehamton, University of Surrey, Research Report on 
ESRC project: The impact of the performance threshold assessment on teachers' work, 
(ESRC 0002239286). 
Makinson, J. (Chair) (2000) Incentives for Change: Rewarding Performance in National 
Government Networks, Public Services Productivity Panel, HM Treasury, London. 
Malcomson, J. M. (1997) ‘Contracts, Hold-Up, and Labor Markets’, Journal of Economic 
Literature, 35:4, December, pp. 1916-1957. 
Marsden, D. W. (2000) ‘Teachers before the ‘Threshold’’, Centre for Economic Performance, 
Discussion Paper No.454, London School of Economics. 
Marsden, D. W., and French, S. (1998) What a Performance: Performance Related Pay in the 
Public Services, Centre for Economic Performance Special Report, London School of 
Economics, London, available online from www.cep.lse.ac.uk. 
  22
Marsden D. W. and Belfield, R. (2005a) ‘Unions and Performance-Related Pay: What Chance Of A 
Procedural Justice Role?’, in S. Fernie and D. Metcalf (eds), Trade Unions: Resurgence or 
Demise, Routledge, London. 
Marsden, D. W. (2005b) ‘Performance Pay for Teachers: Linking Individual and Organisational-
Level Targets’, Centre for Economic Performance, Discussion Paper No.703, London 
School of Economics. 
Murnane, R. J. and Cohen, D. K. (1986) ‘Merit Pay and the Evaluation Problem: Why Most Merit 
Pay Plans Fail and a Few Survive’, Harvard Educational Review; 56: 1 February, pp. 1-17. 
Ofsted (1996) The Appraisal of Teachers 1991-1996: a Report from the Office of Her Majesty’s 
Chief Inspector of Schools, Ref: HMR/18/96/NS, Office for Standards in Education, 
London, 26 pages. 
Prendergast, C. (1999) ‘The Provision of Incentives Within Firms’, Journal of Economic Literature, 
37, pp. 7-63. 
Richardson, R. (1999) Performance Related Pay in Schools: An Assessment of the Green Papers. A 
Report for the National Union of Teachers, National Union of Teachers, London. 
Rousseau, D. (1995) Psychological Contracts in Organisations: Understanding Written And 
Unwritten Agreements, Sage, Thousand Oaks, Ca. 
Teulings, C. and Hartog, J. (1998) Corporatism or Competition? Labour Contracts, Institutions and 
Wage Structures in International Comparison, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Tzioumis, K. (2005) Essays on Managerial Incentives: Relative Performance Evaluation, Stock 
Option Introduction, Union Effect and Politics in CEO Compensation in the United States, 
Doctoral thesis, London School of Economics, University of London. 
Varlaam, A., Nuttall, D. and Walker, A. (1992) ‘What Makes Teachers Tick? A Study of Teacher 
Morale and Motivation’, Clare Market Papers, No. 4, Centre for Educational Research, 
London School of Economics, London. 
Walton R. E, and McKersie, R. B. (1965) A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations: An Analysis 
of a Social Interaction System, McGraw-Hill, new York. 
Wragg, E. C., Haynes, G. S., Wragg, C. M. and Chamberlin, R.P. (2001) ‘Performance Related Pay: 
the Views and Experiences of 1,000 Primary and Secondary Head Teachers’, Teachers’ 
Incentive Pay Project, Occasional Paper No. 1, University of Exeter. 
  23
10. Appendix 1: Sample design and questionnaire 
The questionnaire was developed in close consultation with the teachers’ unions and the 
Department for Education and Skills, and piloted on groups of lay representatives. For the first 
wave, a random sample of 1,675 schools was drawn from the Register of Educational 
Establishments for England and a similar register for Wales, and packages of questionnaires were 
sent to head teachers. Heads received a covering letter explaining the nature of the study, that it had 
the support of the head teachers’ associations, and that it had been developed in consultation with 
the teachers’ unions and the DfEE. They were asked to distribute the questionnaires. In small 
schools with under 35 teachers, every teacher was sent a questionnaire, and in larger ones, heads 
were asked to select every nth teacher off the school’s staff list depending on the size of the school. 
Heads were asked to complete a special questionnaire. Being a panel study, the initial respondents 
to wave one were approached again for waves two and three. 
 
The overall response rate to the first wave was about 20%, which comprises a double response: 
whether the head teacher agreed to distribute the questionnaires in the first place, and then whether 
the teachers themselves chose to reply. In many schools, head teachers have a policy of not 
distributing questionnaires in their schools in order not to add to the workload on their teachers. 
 
Initially, the panel included replies from about 4,000 teachers and about 1,000 heads. Accounting 
for sample attrition, it is possible to link replies from about 1,000 teachers and about 300 heads over 
time through the panel. We conducted a number of checks to see whether the panel results reported 
here differ statistically significantly from the simple cross-section results for each wave, and found 
that on the whole they do not. 
 
The questionnaire used for classroom teachers and for head teachers in Wave 3 can be found in 
Marsden and Belfield (2005b). That for wave 1 can be found in Marsden (2000).  
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